A new report published October 5, 2026, by George Washington University’s Program on Extremism documents how al-Qaeda has used the Hamas-led October 7 attack and the ensuing Gaza war to broaden its propaganda, praise Western university protests and turn Gaza into a source of strategic lessons for jihadists elsewhere.
The findings identify two developments with implications for Western security: al-Qaeda’s adoption of political language circulating beyond extremist circles and its leadership’s assessment of how the Gaza experience should inform future campaigns.
Written by Sergio Altuna Galán, From Gaza to Global Jihad examines official propaganda issued over the three years since October 7. It draws on the university’s TITAN Project, which compiles materials from the principal media arms of al-Qaeda and ISIS.
The analysis focuses on al-Qaeda statements and essays attributed to its de facto leader, Sayf al-Adel, writing under the name Salem al-Sharif.
Praise for Western University Protests
In May 2024, al-Qaeda’s official al-Sahab media arm issued a statement praising Western demonstrators, specifically including students at Western universities. Al-Adel subsequently described a global awakening of young people as a consequence of Gaza and argued that the student movement could not be silenced.
Al-Qaeda also promoted boycotts of American, European, Israeli and other Western goods. Its messaging incorporated demonstrations and consumer campaigns alongside its established religious appeals.
Al-Adel treated protests differently depending on their location. In Muslim-majority societies, he urged demonstrators to move beyond protests toward broader political change. Western demonstrations received praise as part of the international response to Gaza.
October 7 Paired With September 11
Al-Qaeda incorporated October 7 into its messaging almost immediately after the attack. An October 2023 statement presented it as a major development in global jihad. By February 2025, a General Command statement explicitly paired September 11 and October 7 as celebrated achievements.
The report finds that al-Qaeda progressively detached the attack from Hamas’s organizational identity. Palestinian fighters were frequently described as mujahidin, allowing al-Qaeda to incorporate their actions into its own account of global jihad without resolving its ideological disagreements with Hamas.
Hamas leaders also received direct recognition in al-Qaeda propaganda. An October 2024 obituary described Yahya Sinwar as the “commander of the blessed Battle of al-Aqsa Flood,” while a February 2025 obituary placed Muhammad Deif within al-Qaeda’s narrative of jihad and sacrifice.
According to the report, al-Qaeda neither planned nor controlled the attack. It nevertheless claimed its ideological and strategic benefits, presenting a Hamas-led operation as an example for a wider jihadist audience.
Strategic Lessons for Future Campaigns
Al-Adel’s essays urged jihadists elsewhere to study the conflict and apply its lessons to future programs. His conclusions included multiplying fronts, prolonging attrition and exploiting the vulnerabilities of a materially superior adversary.
His assessment of hostage-taking changed during the war. Early propaganda treated captives as political and negotiating leverage. By July 2024, he argued that inflicting casualties should take precedence and that future hostage-taking should be limited because captives, he concluded, were not a weapon of deterrence.
The report identifies this shift as evidence of strategic reassessment. Al-Qaeda continued celebrating October 7 while reviewing whether particular components of the attack had produced the expected results.
Al-Adel also advanced a concept he called the armed Umma, or Muslim community. It envisioned military capacity distributed throughout society through weapons possession, stockpiling, local production, technical knowledge and specialized training.
In al-Adel’s model, an armed population would preserve military capacity under pressure, reinforce a political order considered legitimate and serve as a check against tyrannical rule.
Gaza’s local weapons production supplied one example. The report notes that the concept also drew on Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Islamic Maghreb and earlier jihadist thinking.
Liberation Rhetoric and Holocaust Denial
Al-Qaeda’s Gaza messaging incorporated international law, liberation, resistance, civilian suffering and allegations of Western double standards. Al-Adel portrayed Palestinian terrorists as a “popular liberation movement” and claimed, while invoking what he called an “International Court” ruling and United Nations law, that the October 7 attack was legally justified. These were assertions made in al-Qaeda propaganda, not legal conclusions endorsed by the report.
The author describes this development as narrative convergence without ideological convergence. Al-Qaeda adopted themes circulating in broader pro-Palestinian discourse while retaining its religious framework, hostility toward Muslim governments and explicit antisemitism.
Al-Adel’s writings included Holocaust denial and directed readers toward Holocaust deniers such as David Irving and Arthur Butz.
A June 2025 al-Sahab audiovisual production repackaged elements of his essays. Detailed discussions of societal militarization largely disappeared, while civilian suffering and alleged Western hypocrisy received greater emphasis. The report interprets the format as suited to a broader audience, particularly in the West.
ISIS took a different approach, criticizing Hamas’s nationalism, Muslim Brotherhood lineage and ties to Iran. Al-Qaeda made Gaza a sustained subject of strategic study and propaganda expansion.
The report documents al-Qaeda’s use of Gaza for both strategic instruction and broader political messaging. Its leadership has urged jihadists elsewhere to apply lessons from the conflict, while official propaganda has praised Western university demonstrations and promoted boycotts of American and European goods.