A fabricated video showed Iranian missiles striking Tel Aviv. Another depicted panicked crowds fleeing a fictional attack on an airport in Tel Aviv. A third claimed to show captured U.S. special forces held at gunpoint by Iranian troops. None of it was real — but the videos collectively reached tens of millions of viewers across social media platforms in March 2026, as Iran waged what researchers describe as “a sophisticated information war” against Israel and the United States during Operation Epic Fury.

Share

This isn’t traditional propaganda. It’s Fifth-Generation Warfare (5GW) — a systematic campaign to manipulate truth itself, creating what a new academic paper published in April 2026 calls “cognitive paralysis,” a state where populations become unable to distinguish credible information from manipulation. And according to researchers tracking Iran’s operations, the Islamic Republic has emerged as a master of this new form of conflict — one where the battlefield is the human mind, and Israel is a primary target.

The Three-Stage Disinformation Cycle

The research paper, “The Weaponization of Truth: Analyzing Misinformation as a Pillar of Fifth-Generation Warfare,” was published by Malaysian researchers Mehran Hayat and Nazni Noordin in the International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science. The study examined how modern adversaries use disinformation not as a byproduct of conflict, but as a core strategic weapon targeting perception itself.

The researchers identified a strategic cycle that enables disinformation to achieve cognitive paralysis: creation (where information is selectively distorted while preserving elements of truth to enhance credibility), dissemination (content distributed through digital platforms targeting specific audiences), and amplification (where algorithmic systems prioritize engagement-driven content, enabling rapid viral spread).

Critically, the study demonstrates that misleading information consistently achieves greater reach than verified content across digital platforms — a pattern driven by algorithms that reward emotionally charged material regardless of accuracy, reinforcing echo chambers and amplifying psychological impact.

Using the Iran-Israel conflict as a case study, the paper documented how “digitally mediated narratives are deliberately constructed and amplified to influence both domestic and international audiences.” The researchers concluded that governments should “prioritize digital literacy initiatives to strengthen the public’s ability to critically evaluate information” — enhancing analytical awareness to reduce susceptibility to manipulated narratives.

This framework isn’t theoretical. During the February-March 2026 conflict, Iranian state media and proxies launched what NewsGuard described as an unprecedented offensive, identifying 18 false war-related claims by Iranian sources in just two weeks.

AI-Generated Lies at Industrial Scale

Iranian state outlets and covert operatives produced “a steady torrent of propaganda, overstated narratives and outright disinformation,” increasingly wielding generative AI tools to create realistic imagery. Tehran Times published a manipulated satellite image purporting to show destruction at Qatar’s Al-Udeid Air Base. Military-aligned outlet Tasnim claimed 650 U.S. troops were killed or wounded in two days — U.S. Central Command confirmed six fatalities. Semi-official outlet Mehr reported Iranian missiles hit the USS Abraham Lincoln, which CENTCOM stated was neither hit nor targeted.

Iran’s campaign included “flooding platforms such as X, Instagram and Bluesky with targeted postings” featuring AI-generated videos and fabricated footage of strikes on Israeli targets. Clemson researchers discovered that Iranian troll accounts previously posting about Scottish independence or Irish politics were “immediately redirected” after strikes began February 28, suddenly posting “unabashed Iranian propaganda.”

Cyber Operations and Antisemitic Targeting

Iran’s information warfare operates alongside cyber operations. Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 documented an escalation of Iranian-linked activity in March 2026, identifying 7,381 conflict-related phishing URLs across 1,881 unique domains. Iranian-linked groups claimed responsibility for compromising Israeli energy companies, healthcare networks, and payment infrastructure, plus critical infrastructure in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE.

The campaign extends to ideological subversion. A March 2026 briefing by the Simon Wiesenthal Center exposed how Iran uses “propaganda and disinformation to promote antisemitic narratives as part of an effort to undermine the West.”

For Israel and the U.S., facing an adversary that has spent half a century preparing for precisely this form of conflict, the battlefield of the mind may prove more challenging to defend than any physical border.

In a coordinated information campaign that began immediately after the launch of Operation Epic Fury, Iranian embassy accounts across at least four countries have weaponized Epstein conspiracy theories to frame the U.S.-Israeli military operation as a calculated distraction from the release of documents related to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. The effort represents a notable shift in Iranian state messaging — moving from traditional anti-American rhetoric to co-opting Western conspiracy narratives with explicitly antisemitic undertones.

Share

Operation Epic Fury, the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, launched on February 28, 2026. Within days, official Iranian diplomatic channels began circulating content suggesting the operation was designed to divert attention from the Epstein scandal.

Embassy Accounts Amplify “Epsteinian” Framing

Iranian embassy accounts in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, among others, have all deployed variations of the conspiracy theory, often using the hashtag #Epstein or coining terms like “Epsteinian” to link U.S. policy to the disgraced financier.

On March 16, Iran’s embassy in the UK posted: “#Epstein’s criminals are never satiated by children’s blood” — quote-tweeting Press TV footage of civilian casualties from U.S.-Israeli strikes. The post explicitly framed American military action as driven by the same figures implicated in Epstein’s network. Days later, the same account responded to U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with: “Medieval rhetoric from a member of the Epstein class. It’s a shame for American society that someone like this has become their voice.”

Iran’s embassy in Zimbabwe characterized the military strikes using newly coined terminology: “The ‘Epsteinian’ logic of the unlawful attack on Iran: speaking of prosperity while pursuing destruction, bombing a nation toward the ‘Stone Age’ in acts tantamount to war crime and crime against humanity.”

The embassy in South Africa made the antisemitic subtext explicit, referring to “a cowardly assault by the Epstein gang (the criminal Zionist-American alliance)” in a post about a protester’s death during an International Quds Day rally. The parenthetical equation of “Epstein gang” with “Zionist-American alliance” directly links the conspiracy theory to antisemitic narratives about Jewish control of U.S. policy.

Iran's embassy in Sweden posted an image on April 3 with the text: "Iranian missiles advocate women's rights more than political claimants and feminist movements do." The accompanying photo showed a note reading "In revenge for Virginia Giuffre whose voice was silenced by Epstein's network" alongside an image of Giuffre, one of Epstein's most prominent accusers. The post garnered over 1 million views, demonstrating the conspiracy content's viral potential.

Broader Disinformation Ecosystem

The embassy messaging aligns with a wider pro-Iranian propaganda network that has found viral success by merging Epstein conspiracy content with opposition to Operation Epic Fury. The Washington Post documented in March that accounts pushing Tehran’s talking points circulated AI-generated deepfake videos purporting to show Trump with Epstein, accompanied by captions claiming: “These pedophile perverts started a war so that this wouldn’t be talked about.”

One such post from an account called HDX News was viewed more than 6.8 million times, demonstrating the conspiracy theory’s reach beyond official Iranian channels.

Antisemitic Undertones

While Iranian embassy posts avoid explicitly naming Jewish figures or institutions, the campaign’s structure follows familiar antisemitic conspiracy patterns: framing U.S. military action as controlled by hidden forces connected to sexual exploitation and suggesting American leaders act “at the behest” of outside influences. The repeated invocation of Epstein — whose crimes have been co-opted by antisemitic narratives linking powerful Jewish figures to global manipulation — serves as coded language within these networks.

Strategic Disinformation Deployment

The campaign reflects Iran’s adaptation of information warfare tactics. Rather than defending against U.S. military strikes through traditional diplomatic channels, Tehran’s embassies are attempting to delegitimize the operation by linking it to one of the most inflammatory conspiracy theories in contemporary Western discourse.

Disinformation researchers have identified Iran’s use of conspiracy theories and fake news as a longstanding tactic, but the Epstein campaign marks one of the most direct deployments by official diplomatic accounts on a Western social media platform.

As Operation Epic Fury continues, Iranian embassies show no signs of abandoning the messaging strategy — continuing to post content that blends geopolitical commentary with conspiratorial framing, demonstrating how state actors can weaponize Western disinformation ecosystems for strategic communication objectives.

Recent reporting in The Telegraph, citing British government warnings and terrorism experts, says Iran has exploited London’s “permissive environment” for recruitment and influence activity, with Press TV — the regime’s English-language state broadcaster — alleged to play a central role.

The allegations fit a broader pattern documented by Western governments and researchers, who have described Iranian state media and affiliated networks as instruments of propaganda, influence operations, and, in some cases, recruitment activity.

British officials and terrorism experts say Tehran has used London’s openness to support recruitment and operational activity, with Press TV alleged to function as more than a conventional media outlet. Those concerns have been sharpened by recent cases involving Jewish targets in Britain.

Two men were arrested after a firebomb attack on ambulances owned by a Jewish charity in north London. Separately, two Iranian men were charged this month with conducting hostile surveillance of the Israeli embassy, Bevis Marks Synagogue, and other Jewish targets.

Jonathan W. Hackett, a former U.S. Marine Corps interrogator and special operations capabilities specialist with roughly two decades of intelligence-related experience, told The Telegraph that, in his assessment, Press TV personnel have been used to spot and assess potential recruits before those contacts are passed to more experienced Iranian handlers in Tehran.

Share

The Monica Witt Recruitment Pipeline

Press TV’s alleged role in recruitment extends beyond potential local assets. Hackett explained that Marzieh Hashemi, a Press TV presenter, may have played an early-stage role in the recruitment of Monica Witt, one of the Iranian regime’s most significant U.S. intelligence defections. Public U.S. charging documents in the case do not name Hashemi, and she was not charged.

Witt, a former U.S. Air Force counterintelligence specialist with access to classified national defense information, defected to Iran in 2013. According to Hackett’s account, Hashemi may have served as an initial contact in Witt’s recruitment before Witt was allegedly passed to Iranian intelligence personnel in Tehran. “The Monica Witt case was like a bombshell on the intelligence community,” Hackett said. “This was the biggest win the Iranian regime ever had.”

The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Press TV in September 2023, citing not only the broadcaster’s airing of forced confessions from journalists and activists, but also stating that the outlet had been used by Iranian intelligence services to recruit sensitive assets, including U.S. persons. The designation gave official U.S. backing to longstanding concerns that Press TV has served not only as a propaganda outlet, but also as a channel used by Iranian intelligence services for coercive and recruitment-related activity.

Creating “Target Lists” for Extremists

Beyond the recruitment allegations, critics quoted by The Telegraph, including representatives of the Community Security Trust, say Press TV programming has publicized and vilified Jewish institutions in ways that raise serious security concerns.

A CST spokesman told The Telegraph that Press TV’s flagship program Palestine Declassified was “the most anti-Semitic media currently produced in this country,” and CST has separately raised concerns about material targeting Jewish institutions and individuals in Britain.

The program is presented by two prominent British left-wing figures: Chris Williamson, a former Labour MP suspended from the party after dismissing antisemitism concerns as “smears,” and David Miller, an academic dismissed from the University of Bristol after comments about Jewish students and Israel drew sustained controversy.

As a CST spokesman told The Telegraph, each episode follows a similar pattern: the presenters “pick a topic and highlight large numbers of ordinary Jewish organisations, charities, schools and individuals. They paint them all as genocidal, Zionist extremists who are infiltrating Britain.” Because the material is broadcast by Iranian state media, the spokesman said, it raises concerns about the safety of the people and institutions singled out and requires additional security and monitoring work to mitigate possible threats.

A Broader Apparatus of Influence Operations

Press TV’s London presence appears to sit within a much broader Iranian media and influence infrastructure designed to shape Western opinion and advance Tehran’s strategic interests. Research published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, together with reporting on the Iran Experts Initiative, has described a multi-layered Iranian influence apparatus that includes cyber campaigns, disinformation networks, impersonation operations, cultivation of sympathetic outside voices, and more traditional recruitment efforts.

Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Intelligence Organization have both been linked by Western officials and researchers to influence and disinformation campaigns targeting foreign audiences.

Reporting on the Iran Experts Initiative described Iranian diplomatic efforts to cultivate outside analysts and policy specialists who could help advance Tehran’s positions in Western policy and media circles, particularly on issues such as nuclear diplomacy. During the 2024 U.S. election cycle, U.S. officials and private-sector researchers also documented Iranian cyber-enabled influence efforts, including hack-and-leak operations and disinformation targeting U.S. political figures.

The reach extends beyond traditional broadcast media. Microsoft reported that traffic to Iranian state and state-affiliated news outlets rose about 42 percent in the first week after October 7, especially in English-speaking countries aligned with the United States, and remained significantly above prewar levels a month later. Much of that material circulated through Iranian state and state-affiliated media ecosystems across social media and alternative video platforms, where Press TV has retained a substantial audience despite having had its UK broadcast licence revoked by Ofcom in 2012.

Sanctions and the Grey Zone

In March, a group of MPs wrote to Security Minister Dan Jarvis urging Press TV's designation under the UK financial sanctions regime. The Telegraph reported that officials had discussed possible sanctions, with one government source stating: “They are essentially providing a target list for terrorists. Shutting Press TV down would send a strong message—and it would protect the Jewish community from immediate, documented threats.”

Online data from February 28 to March 13 reveals a coordinated foreign influence operation systematically flooding X with anti-U.S. and pro-Iranian regime messaging, according to research by Ryan Mauro, president of The Mauro Institute and senior fellow for counter extremism at the Capital Research Center.

The findings, featured on Glenn Beck's program, expose a three-pronged propaganda assault targeting American and English-speaking users: domestically-originating English posts amplifying foreign narratives, misleadingly-attributed overseas posts masquerading as American commentary, and automatically-translated non-English content algorithmically surfaced to Western audiences.

Share

The Foreign Origin Problem

Of the 1,000 posts analyzed, 559—more than half—originated from non-U.S. accounts, collectively generating over 650 million views and nearly 22 million interactions including reposts, likes, and replies. Among the top 100 most-viral posts, 40 originated from outside the United States, indicating that overseas accounts punch disproportionately above their weight in shaping discourse.

A randomly sampled subset of 150 posts revealed that 72% of all viral Iran-related content was negative toward U.S. interests. However, the sentiment disparity between foreign and domestic posts was stark: only 10% of non-U.S. viral posts were positive, while 64% were negative. The remaining portion was neutral.

“The non-U.S. subset was overwhelmingly negative,” Mauro’s analysis concluded. U.S.-based users frequently amplified foreign messaging, with many parroting Iranian government narratives and quoting hostile overseas accounts as sources of authority.

Platform Mechanisms Amplifying Foreign Propaganda

X’s introduction of automatic post translation via Grok approximately nine months before this analysis created an additional vector for foreign influence. English-speaking users now encounter substantial volumes of non-English content—automatically translated and algorithmically prioritized—without explicit notification that the source material originated overseas or context about its origin.

This technical feature compounds the visibility problem. Western audiences receive hostile foreign propaganda through three simultaneous channels: U.S.-based posts repeating foreign talking points, overseas-based English posts that superficially appear domestic, and translated non-English content lacking source attribution.

The Narrative Architecture

Two dominant narratives emerged from the analysis of negative posts: first, allegations that a “Zionist conspiracy” manipulated or coerced President Trump into authorizing Operation Epic Fury, and second, claims that the military campaign functioned as a “Wag the Dog” distraction from evidence purportedly implicating Trump in the Jeffrey Epstein scandal while reversing declining approval ratings.

The concentration of amplification power proved significant. Just 10 accounts generated 32% of all views across the 1,000-post sample, while the top 20 accounts generated 43%.

The highest-impact accounts included The White House (144 million views across 18 posts), BRICS News—labeled an “independent media company” which formerly listed its location as the UAE until recently changing it to the U.S. (87 million views across 31 posts), and Globe Eye News listing South Asia as its location (58 million views across 13 posts).

Among individual accounts, Jackson Hinkle—a Moscow-based podcaster and former pro-Trump influencer who co-founded the American Communist Party and attended Hezbollah founder Hassan Nasrallah’s funeral—generated 31 million views across 26 posts.

Hinkle has documented associations with Russian intelligence-linked intellectual Alexander Dugin, whose stated focus is influencing Western conservatives, libertarians, and Christians.

Sarah Abdallah (@sahouraxo), who identifies as an “independent Lebanese geopolitical commentator,” generated 22 million views across 10 posts while openly advocating for the Iranian regime, its proxy organizations, and the Russian government. According to Mauro’s analysis, there is reasonable suspicions linking her account to Hezbollah.

The Reality Gap

Mauro’s analysis documents a profound disconnect between social media discourse and measurable American public opinion. Polling data shows 81% of MAGA Republicans and 61% of non-MAGA Republicans support Operation Epic Fury. A three-point plurality of Americans overall support the operation, and 66% view Iran as a serious threat to U.S. national security.

“Life as it appears on social media is not like real life or anything close to it,” Mauro wrote. Yet he emphasized that the long-term trajectory of American civil society and global public opinion increasingly depends on what algorithms prioritize on social media timelines and the information ecosystem surrounding those platforms.

“If one party or coalition achieves social media dominance, it will be no less decisive than controlling the Strait of Hormuz or the Pacific’s first island chain,” Mauro concluded.

A 22-month coordinated influence operation appears to have repeatedly targeted fracture points within the Republican Party and the Trump administration, according to a data analysis published by Alexis Wilkins, the girlfriend of FBI Director Kash Patel. The analysis documents 3.1 million retweet engagements across six major incidents and identifies patterns suggesting coordinated amplification, foreign media involvement, and recurring links to organizations associated with retired Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn.

Wilkins, who became a target herself in July 2025 when she was falsely claimed to be an Israeli intelligence operative, conducted the analysis using the official X API. Her findings show the same network of accounts activating at key Republican crisis points, from messaging in May 2024 before the Butler assassination attempt to the March 2026 resignation of National Counterterrorism Center Director Joe Kent over the Iran war.

The timeline also points to recurring overlap among conservative media personalities and organizations identified in Wilkins’ dataset. Catholics for Catholics, which lists Flynn as a “Current Senior Advisor” on its website, hosted Kent at its Washington gala on March 19, two days after his resignation. Within 72 hours, Kent appeared onstage with Flynn and conservative commentator Candace Owens at the Waldorf Astoria.

The State Department has designated Russian state media outlet RT as “part of Russia’s intelligence apparatus” engaged in “covert influence activities” globally. Wilkins’ analysis places RT among the top 15 amplifiers across the 22-month dataset. When RT posted about Wilkins by name in July 2025, falsely alleging that she was a Mossad honeypot, the claim was amplified by the official Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by an Iranian journalist based in Tehran.

Coordinated Timing and Amplification Patterns

The analysis identifies engagement patterns that differ from organic content spread. In the July 2025 campaign targeting Wilkins, 659 accounts retweeted the same post, with some retweets occurring just one second apart and 15 account pairs retweeting within 10 seconds of one another. At peak activity, the network produced 54 retweets in a single hour, contributing to 863,568 total retweet engagements in that chapter alone.

The operation’s earliest documented activation came in May 2024, 10 days before the Butler assassination attempt on Donald Trump. Ivan Raiklin, a former Defense Intelligence Agency officer who serves on the board of Flynn’s nonprofit, America’s Future, posted directly to Elon Musk and JD Vance suggesting that Gen. Flynn would make Trump “assassination-proof.” That post received 166 retweets across 14 tightly clustered bursts, with some amplification occurring just one second apart.

The Kirk Assassination and Fracture Amplification

According to Wilkins, the network’s most sustained activation followed the Sept. 10, 2025, assassination of Turning Point USA founder Charlie Kirk at Utah Valley University. Within hours of his death, Candace Owens publicly blamed Israel for the killing and targeted Kirk’s widow, Erika, by name.

Many of the same accounts identified in previous chapters became active again immediately after Kirk’s assassination, Wilkins’ analysis found. What might have been a moment of Republican unity instead became one of the most divisive episodes of 2025. Owens later produced a multi-part video series titled The Bride of Charlie, accusing Erika Kirk of potential involvement in her husband’s death and claiming that pressure from the Israeli lobby played a role in the assassination.

Throughout March 2026, as the Iran war divided Republicans, RT published commentary from Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin — frequently described as “Putin’s brain” — declaring MAGA “more than dead, worse than dead, it’s now an undead, a ghoul.” The messaging aligned with domestic divisions surrounding Kent’s resignation.

Kent Resignation and Anti-Enlistment Messaging

Kent, a former Green Beret who lost two congressional races as a Trump-aligned candidate, resigned as NCTC director on March 17, 2026, citing his opposition to the Iran war. In his resignation letter, Kent claimed that Iran “posed no imminent threat” to the United States and alleged that Israeli officials and lobbyists had “deployed a misinformation campaign” to deceive President Trump into war.

“We started this war due to pressure from Israel,” Kent wrote in his resignation letter to Trump. Some Republican lawmakers accused Kent of espousing anti-Semitic views. Trump responded that Kent “was weak on security” and said he was glad the counterterrorism director had stepped down.

During this period, accounts in the network posted messages stating, “Refuse to enlist in or remain fighting for the U.S. military.” Owens also wrote publicly, “May American troops take his lead,” referring to Kent’s resignation during active U.S. military operations in Iran.

Foreign Amplification and Russian Media Integration

The two-way flow between domestic accounts and Russian state media forms a recurring pattern across the six chapters. When RT content about Wilkins appeared, it was allegedly amplified by accounts that had participated in previous chapters. When domestic influencers posted divisive content, RT and other Russian outlets amplified it internationally.

A September 2024 State Department assessment found that RT had embedded cyber capabilities, conducted military procurement for Russian forces in Ukraine, and operated proxy outlets globally while concealing RT’s involvement. The assessment also found that RT employees were “leveraging intelligence tactics, front companies, and network technologies to obfuscate their role in these covert efforts.”

Methodology and Persistence

Wilkins’ analysis tracked accounts across all six documented chapters: messaging before the Butler assassination attempt in May 2024, the July 2025 “Mossad honeypot” campaign targeting Wilkins herself, the response to Kirk’s assassination in September 2025, and three additional undisclosed chapters culminating in Kent’s March 2026 resignation. Wilkins said the dataset shows that 80% of all activity consisted of pure amplification rather than original content or conversation.

“The goal of this operation is not to win a political argument, but to make the fractures feel permanent,” Wilkins wrote in her analysis thread. “To make Republicans believe their movement is over. To make soldiers feel the war isn’t worth fighting.”

Wilkins said the complete dataset will be released in full.

Following Jewish Onliner’s report on foreign amplification of anti–Operation Epic Fury content on X, two prominent accounts named in the analysis — BRICS News and Mario Nawfal — appear to have changed their X location labels. After publication, Jewish Onliner found that BRICS News appeared as U.S.-based, while Nawfal’s account shifted from a UAE identification to a North America label, including a connection through the North American app store.

Original Report Put Foreign Amplifiers at the Center

Jewish Onliner’s initial review, conducted with an independent social-media analytics firm, examined 100 highly viral X posts with more than 10,000 shares each during the first week of Operation Epic Fury. The firm’s seven-day listening window, covering February 28 through March 7, found 98 million posts, 696.4 million interactions, and 1.5 trillion potential views tied to the keyword “Iran.” Within that dataset, seven of the ten accounts generating the most interaction were based outside the United States, and all seven were negative toward the operation.

The report found that both UAE-based accounts framed the campaign in anti-Western terms and helped shape what millions of users saw in the platform’s high-engagement spaces. In the sample of 100 viral posts,foreign posts generated roughly 155.6 million views, compared with 93.4 million for U.S.-based posts.

Account Location Data Becomes Part of the Story

This story shows that account location data on X has become an important part of the information battle around major geopolitical events. That is especially true when accounts based outside the U.S. help drive some of the most viral narratives around a U.S. national-security issue. When those same accounts later appear with new geographic labels showing them as U.S.- or North America-based after scrutiny, questions about the intent of those narratives come into sharper focus. Jewish Onliner’s original findings also drew follow-on coverage from other outlets, including Iran International, The American Spectator, and Legal Insurrection.

Travis Hawley, a former intelligence and media analyst at the NSA, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. CENTCOM who currently teaches open source intelligence to the Department of Homeland Security, has uncovered a sophisticated multi-nation coordinated information operation operating on X that appeared designed to amplify disinformation about the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict while promoting narratives favorable to Russia, China, and Iran.

The investigation, which Hawley published in a 16-part X thread on March 23, 2026, identifies a central coordinating account called “Global Insight Journal” that was created in September 2025, underwent multiple username changes, and achieved verified status in February 2026—just weeks before the Iran conflict began on February 28, 2026. According to Hawley’s analysis, the account operated according to a three-phase amplification strategy: Turkish seeding, Iranian boosting, and Russian boosting.

When asked by Jewish Onliner about the main objective of the information operation outlined in his thread, Hawley said:

Share

The Infrastructure and Timeline

Hawley documented that “Global Insight Journal” follows exclusively the official account of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a red flag suggesting potential state coordination. The account posts dozens of times daily, consistently amplifying content from Russia’s state media outlet RT, Iran’s PressTV, and Turkish media sources. The account had accumulated approximately 3.3 million views on a single video by the time of Hawley’s investigation.

According to Hawley’s timeline analysis, the account’s posting volume showed a marked drop between March 3-5, coinciding precisely with the destruction of Islamic Republic Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Iran’s state propaganda headquarters. Operations resumed and recovered between March 7-14, suggesting operational dependency on Iranian state infrastructure or coordination.

The critical moment in the investigation occurred on March 6, when “Global Insight Journal” posted twice within nine minutes of each other, both reporting that Russia and China were providing military aid to Iran during the conflict. This synchronized posting suggested pre-planned messaging rather than organic news coverage.

The Amplification Network

Hawley traced the disinformation pipeline to its Turkish origin point. A Turkish media account called Meltem TV initially posted an intentionally misquoted video that received only 12,000 views. “Global Insight Journal” subsequently amplified the same content to 3.3 million views. Russian propagandist Alexander Dugin—identified by Hawley as “Putin’s Brain” due to his influence as a geopolitical strategist and ideological advisor—then amplified the content further to 1.2 million additional views.

Dugin’s role in the coordinated operation reveals a deeper strategic purpose. Despite actively participating in the Russia-China-Iran-Turkey disinformation operation, Dugin’s own posts explicitly claimed that Russia, China, and Iran are not enemies of the United States—a contradiction designed to mask the coordinated nature of the influence campaign.

Additionally, Hawley documented that Dugin had intensified posting about Sunni Muslims over the three-week period preceding and following the conflict initiation, and subsequently began calling for an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East aligned against the West and “Zionism.”

Narrative Construction and Purpose

The investigation reveals that the coordinated operation served multiple strategic objectives. The false claims that Russia and China were aiding Iran directly contradicted actual geopolitical positioning and appeared designed to generate Western alarm about great-power military coordination against U.S. interests. Simultaneously, the campaign promoted narratives framing Western military action against Iran as unjustified intervention, while positioning Islamic resistance and regional powers as victims of Western aggression.

Hawley noted that “Global Insight Journal” systematically shared content from state-controlled propaganda outlets without disclosing their origins, effectively laundering state narratives through what appeared to be an independent news analysis account. The account’s recent creation, multiple username changes, and rapid verification suggested either direct state coordination or sophisticated commercial operation working on behalf of state interests.

Implications for Platform Accountability

Hawley directed his findings toward X’s leadership, specifically tagging Head of Product Nikita Bier, and recommended platform-level countermeasures. He noted that accounts participating in related coordinated inauthentic behavior had changed usernames as many as 14 times in just two weeks—a technical pattern that could be flagged and restricted by platform policy. Hawley indicated that Indian, Pakistani, and Indonesian bot networks and sock puppet enterprises were likely involved in broader coordination efforts, based on account location data and behavioral patterns.

Asked what X should do to mitigate the issue, Hawley told Jewish Onliner:

The investigation demonstrates how state-sponsored disinformation operations exploit social media platform architecture to achieve massive reach without disclosure of state involvement. By using recent account creation, rapid verification, and coordinated amplification through international networks, the operation achieved millions of impressions while obscuring the coordinating actors and strategic purpose behind the messaging.

Somaliland water experts recently returned to Hargeisa, wrapping up a weeks-long training program in Israeli water management that continued during Operation Epic Fury—the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iranian regime targets launched February 28

The program, organized by MASHAV (Israel's Agency for International Development Cooperation), trained the first cohort of Somaliland engineers in water recycling, desalination, and infrastructure management—fields in which Israel has pioneered out of necessity. The timing underscores a strategic pattern: even amid active conflict, Israel continues leveraging its water expertise as a diplomatic asset, particularly with partners in water-scarce regions.

The 25-person delegation, led by Somaliland Ministry of Water Development Director General Aden Abdullah Abdullah and Chief Engineer Omar Ahmed Ibrahim, visited facilities including the Shafdan wastewater treatment complex in Rishon LeZion—which processes 97 million gallons daily.

The delegation also visited the Al-Furaa Off-Grid Hub, a project developed by the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies with local and agtech partners, focused on drinking water, sanitation, energy, and waste management in a Bedouin community. Ambassador Rony Yedidia Clein also documented the delegation's visit to Shafdan, highlighting Israel's world-leading wastewater reclamation technology.

Training Continued Through Conflict

The Somaliland delegation arrived in Israel on February 24, just days before Operation Epic Fury began. When U.S. and Israeli forces launched the military campaign against Iranian targets on February 28, the water engineers were already engaged in their coursework at Israeli facilities.

The training program continued uninterrupted throughout the three-week operation—the delegation visited the Shafdan complex, toured Arava Institute projects, and received classroom instruction even as Israeli forces conducted strikes in Iran. Their March 18 departure came as the operation wound down, demonstrating Israel’s commitment to maintaining technical cooperation programs despite active military engagement.

From Desert to Abundance: Israel’s Water Innovation

Israel’s transformation from water-stress nation to water-secure innovator demonstrates what technological innovation can achieve under pressure. With nearly 90% of Israel’s wastewater treated and reused for agriculture and irrigation, and roughly 80% of its potable water needs supplied by desalination, Israel has achieved what many once considered impossible, transforming arid conditions into durable water security. The original Sorek I desalination plant was built with a capacity of about 164.8 million gallons per day, and newer facilities such as Soreq B have further expanded national capacity.

The journey began decades ago out of necessity. In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel faced severe water shortages as its population grew and the desert climate limited natural freshwater sources. Engineers pioneered drip irrigation in the 1960s, invented by Simcha Blass, revolutionizing agricultural water efficiency worldwide. By the 1990s, Israel was recycling wastewater on an unprecedented scale—today it recycles approximately 90% of its wastewater which is used for irrigation, far exceeding any other nation (Spain, in second place, recycles about 30%).

The desalination breakthrough came in the 2000s, with massive plants along the Mediterranean coast transforming seawater into drinking water at increasingly efficient costs. This combination of recycling, desalination, and conservation turned Israel from a nation rationing water to one that now supplies its neighbors and exports its technology globally.

Addressing Somaliland’s Water Crisis

The water training program appears to be the first major water-sector cooperation initiative since Israel recognized Somaliland in December 2025 For Somaliland—which faces frequent droughts, limited groundwater monitoring, and significant municipal water losses—Israeli technology offers practical solutions: brackish water desalination, leak detection systems, and network optimization.

MASHAV designed the curriculum specifically for Somaliland’s infrastructure needs. Engineer Sharmake, one of the participants, said the training provided “valuable insight into national water resource management.” The delegation received hands-on exposure to treatment plant operations, monitoring systems, and cutting-edge technologies. Israeli experts are expected to visit Somaliland to assist with implementing specific systems tailored to local conditions.

Sharing Solutions Across Borders

Israel’s water expertise has facilitated cooperation with neighbors facing similar challenges. With the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, Israel has pursued post-normalization cooperation in water management, agriculture, and food-security technologies. Regional organizations like EcoPeace Middle East work to expand collaborative water management, emphasizing shared environmental challenges that transcend political boundaries.

Under the 1994 Israel–Jordan peace treaty, Israel provides Jordan with 30 million cubic meters of water annually, according to a Jordanian official cited by Reuters

Water cooperation with Palestinians formally runs through the Joint Water Committee established under the Oslo framework. Palestinian official figures published in 2025 said West Bank purchases from Israel had reached 85.9 million cubic meters annually.

Technology Meets Need

Water scarcity affects millions across Africa and the Middle East, with climate change intensifying the crisis. Israel’s experience—transforming severe shortage into self-sufficiency within decades—offers a replicable model for nations facing similar conditions. The technical solutions developed in Israeli facilities, from advanced drip irrigation to wastewater recycling, address universal problems with proven effectiveness.

The Somaliland program demonstrates how expertise sharing can address urgent humanitarian needs even during periods of regional conflict. As these 25 engineers return home with advanced training, they they bring back expertise that could strengthen Somaliland’s water planning and service delivery over time—showing how innovation developed under constraint can create opportunity far beyond its original borders.

Researchers at Mohamed bin Zayed University of Artificial Intelligence in Abu Dhabi and University of Maryland in College Park tested state-of-the-art AI language models on their ability to forecast the trajectory of the 2026 Iran-US-Israel war as it unfolded in real time — a conflict that erupted entirely after the models’ training data ended. Between February 27 and March 6, 2026, the crisis escalated from Operation Epic Fury through coordinated Israeli-US strikes, Iranian retaliation, the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and ultimately a nine-country regional war.

The study, released March 18, reveals a striking pattern: AI systems excelled at predicting economic shockwaves and military logistics but struggled dramatically when interpreting political signals, leadership transitions, and multi-actor diplomatic maneuvering. The findings expose a critical gap in how artificial intelligence reasons about the “fog of war” — performing best when analyzing material constraints, but failing when human decision-making becomes unpredictable.

AI Saw the Credibility Trap Before Strikes Began

Before any shots were fired, the models demonstrated what researchers called “strategic intuition.” On February 27, when the U.S. announced Operation Epic Fury — a massive military buildup in the Gulf — Claude and GPT-5.4 reasoned that the deployment scale had created a “point of no return.” The systems argued that withdrawing such forces without extracting concessions would constitute “catastrophic credibility loss,” predicting strikes were imminent despite ongoing Geneva peace talks.

Within 24 hours, Israeli-US forces struck Iranian targets on February 28, confirming the AI forecast. Iran retaliated the same day with missile strikes on U.S. bases across Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. An Israeli strike killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, triggering a succession crisis.

The study’s design addressed a persistent problem in AI evaluation: training data contamination. By constructing 11 temporal decision points and feeding models only information available at each moment, researchers eliminated hindsight bias. Models received contemporaneous news reports from 12 international outlets — no future knowledge, no retrospective analysis.

Where Machines Succeeded: Economics and Logistics

AI models achieved their highest accuracy when reasoning about economic and logistical constraints, scoring 0.79 out of 1.0 in calibration. When Qatar halted LNG production on March 2 and attacks targeted oil infrastructure, systems correctly predicted global market volatility and supply chain disruptions.

The models also demonstrated an ability to “disentangle rhetoric from rational doctrine.” Despite inflammatory Iranian threats of “regional war without limits,” AI systems assessed that retaliation would target military installations rather than civilian centers — reasoning that indiscriminate attacks would “guarantee catastrophic US escalation.” This prediction aligned with observed Iranian strike patterns.

When missiles struck British bases in Cyprus on March 1, models correctly predicted NATO would not invoke Article 5. They reasoned that consensus mechanisms and Turkey-Hungary opposition would block formal alliance involvement — distinguishing individual member state actions from collective defense triggers.

Where Machines Failed: Political Signals and Succession

The systems’ performance collapsed when analyzing politically ambiguous scenarios, scoring only 0.67 in “Political Signaling” domains. Leadership transitions proved especially problematic.

After Khamenei’s death and his son Mojtaba’s rapid succession on March 3, models diverged wildly. Some predicted aggressive escalation to establish credibility with IRGC hardliners; others forecast paralysis from institutional chaos. Neither proved fully accurate as Iran issued an apology to neighboring countries by March 6, signaling de-escalation attempts.

Gemini-3.1-flash over-extrapolated that Iran would immediately withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty after the Natanz facility was damaged on March 2. Other models correctly reasoned this was unlikely due to “catastrophic diplomatic costs,” highlighting inconsistent threat assessment.

When evaluating whether the UK would join strikes, Gemini overweighted domestic political pressure from opposition figures like Nigel Farage, assigning “moderate to high” likelihood despite the Royal Navy’s explicit withdrawal from the Gulf. Claude and GPT-5.4 prioritized material indicators — the absence of warships — and correctly predicted the UK would remain in a support role.

The Evolution: From Containment to Entrenchment

Perhaps most revealing was how AI narratives shifted across the 11-day timeline. Early forecasts emphasized rapid containment and limited engagement. As the conflict expanded to nine countries and Israel launched ground operations into Lebanon on March 3, models recalibrated toward “systemic accounts of regional entrenchment and attritional de-escalation.”

This temporal evolution exposed a key limitation: models struggled with decentralized command structures. Iran’s “Mosaic doctrine” — distributing strike authority across IRGC units — meant no central authority could easily implement ceasefires, confounding AI expectations of hierarchical decision-making.

Implications for AI in Geopolitical Analysis

The researchers emphasize their work examines reasoning patterns, not operational forecasting. The study archives model responses as “a snapshot of AI reasoning during an unfolding crisis,” enabling future comparison as the conflict — still ongoing as of March 18 — continues to develop.

The findings suggest AI systems excel when geopolitical dynamics follow structural logic: economic incentives, material constraints, institutional procedures. They falter when human decision-making becomes less predictable — leadership psychology, factional politics, symbolic gestures.

For organizations using AI to analyze Middle East conflicts, the study offers a clear warning: machines can map the chess board but still misread the players.

A new strategic assessment published by Israel’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies maps out alternative futures for Iran following the joint U.S.-Israeli Operation Epic Fury, identifying scenarios ranging from optimal regime change to the necessity of another war.

Subscribe now

The analysis, published March 18, by Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai, a senior researcher at the BESA Center specializing in national security and strategic planning, evaluates how several unresolved variables could shape Iran’s trajectory moving forward.

Operation’s Impact and Outstanding Questions

According to the assessment, Operation Epic Fury has dramatically altered Iran’s strategic position. While a significant portion of the regime’s immediate arsenal has been destroyed, its long-term capacity for rehabilitation has been even more severely degraded. The Iranian leadership has taken heavy damage and is only partially functioning, while a regional defense coalition has greatly reduced Iran’s ability to inflict damage on targets including Israel and threaten maritime energy traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Building on these military gains, Shabtai identifies six fundamental variables that will determine whether this tactical dominance translates into a lasting strategic transformation: whether the Iranian public will reach a tipping point to actively overthrow the regime, who the real decision-makers in Iran are today and their actual positions beyond public defiance, whether the U.S. and allies can minimize disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, finding a solution for Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles protected deep in mountain sites, the possibility of Iranian extreme actions such as chemical or radioactive weapons use or major terrorist attacks, and how long President Trump will view the war as succeeding in reaching his goals.

Seven Scenarios From Optimal to Negative

The BESA Center assessment outlines seven distinct scenarios based on an “alternative futures” methodology:

1. Optimal: Popular uprising successfully topples the regime while hostilities conclude.

2. Good: The conflict ends first, followed by regime collapse as Iranians, emboldened by witnessing their government’s weakness, mobilize for change.

3. Affirmative: Tehran’s leadership accepts a far-reaching agreement constraining its chemical weapons program, nuclear ambitions, ballistic missile development, proxy warfare networks, human rights abuses, and naval aggression, culminating in what Shabtai defines as a “CNOHMP Deal” — a comprehensive framework addressing Chemical, Nuclear, Other (ballistic), Human Rights, Maritime, and Proxy threats.

4. Tolerable: The regime becomes hardened but weakened, no longer capable of threatening neighbors while undergoing extended internal decline.

5. Enforcement: The regime attempts rebuilding its military infrastructure, necessitating periodic strikes by Washington and/or Jerusalem to degrade reconstruction efforts.

6. Another War: Tehran successfully reconstitutes capabilities, compelling another major military campaign (dubbed Roaring Lion 3) to again set back the regime and create fresh opportunities for internal change.

7. Negative: The regime remilitarizes while international actors, including Jerusalem, prove unable or unwilling to intervene effectively.

Shabtai’s analysis suggests the middle scenarios, involving either regime fragmentation or the need for military intervention, represent the most probable trajectories absent major shifts toward either popular revolution or diplomatic breakthrough.

Four Models for Continued Regime Control

If the existing regime maintains control, the assessment identifies four possible configurations based on external and internal behavior:

‘Venezuela’ Model: Tehran’s elite could prioritize their own survival by making significant external concessions, either publicly or through covert arrangements, while maintaining iron-fisted domestic rule. Shabtai notes this transformation would require time to coalesce within regime circles.

‘North Korea’ Model: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could consolidate power into a military dictatorship characterized by both external belligerence and domestic repression. While this path appears plausible, Shabtai views it as inherently unstable over time.

‘Gorbachev’ Model: A figure within the establishment could emerge to liberalize both foreign relations and domestic governance, stabilizing the regime through moderation rather than force. However, no potential candidates for such leadership have been identified.

‘Rafsanjani’ Model: The regime could attempt returning to earlier patterns where aggressive regional behavior generated nationalist support at home while allowing some domestic breathing room. Shabtai considers current conditions incompatible with this approach.

The assessment concludes that IRGC military rule represents the likeliest continuation scenario, with minimal prospects for either external or internal moderation.

Alternative Leadership Models for New Regime

For scenarios involving a new regime, the analysis cross-references stability and openness to identify four alternatives:

‘King’ Scenario: A strongman ruler could establish autocratic stability, the historical norm for Iran, though whether Iranians would accept such governance after decades of authoritarian rule remains uncertain.

‘Chaos’ Scenario: Weak authoritarian leadership could struggle to maintain cohesion across Iran’s diverse population, potentially sparking conflicts between political factions (pro-monarchy versus Islamist elements) and ethnic groups. This contradicts deep-rooted Iranian national identity.

‘President’ Scenario: Iran could transition toward electoral democracy and representative government, without historical precedent, raising questions about long-term viability.

‘Federation’ Scenario: Democratic regionalization could see Iran reorganize along ethnic or factional lines through negotiated settlements and popular votes, though major metropolitan areas like Tehran and Isfahan would complicate such divisions.

Shabtai assesses higher probability for scenarios maintaining Iranian state integration, reflecting broad public consensus, though whether an autocratic or democratic ruler would emerge remains difficult to predict.

Four-Point Strategic Recommendation

The BESA Center assessment concludes with four main recommendations:

Prepare for additional rounds: With neither regime collapse nor comprehensive diplomatic agreement appearing imminent, the U.S. and Israel should begin preparing now for post-conflict enforcement strikes and establishing conditions favorable for future operations as needed.

Pressure for comprehensive deal: Beyond pursuing regime change, and given Iran’s attacks on regional neighbors plus Strait of Hormuz disruptions, Western powers should build maximum international consensus demanding Tehran accept sweeping constraints across all threat categories—nuclear, chemical, ballistic, proxy, maritime, and human rights.

Locate alternative leadership: Intensified efforts should seek individuals capable of redirecting Iranian governance, either a reformer within the current system or a potential authoritarian replacement, possibly the same person evolving from internal change agent to new leader. Actively supporting such figures could fracture hardline consensus within the IRGC. Resources should not be concentrated on unlikely scenarios like territorial fragmentation or democratic transition.

Maintain cohesive international coalition: The existing coalition, American-led nations joined by targeted Middle Eastern states plus European and Asian partners, presents Tehran with limited diplomatic maneuverability, with Russia and India effectively acquiescing through non-interference.

The assessment provides a framework for understanding how the conclusion of Operation Epic Fury could unfold across multiple dimensions, with significant implications for U.S. and Israeli strategic planning in the months and potentially years ahead.

Over the past two years, violent rhetoric targeting Jews and Israelis has undergone a fundamental transformation across social media platforms. What was once confined to extremist forums or expressed through coded language like “Globalize the Intifada” has evolved into explicit calls for violence, detailed tactical instructions, and open justifications of terrorist attacks—delivered by influencers with millions of followers, activists with mainstream institutional ties, and public figures who face minimal consequences for their statements. The trend has reached new heights amidst Operation Epic Fury,

The shift reflects more than a change in tone: across multiple high-reach influencer accounts with millions of followers, content has included encouragement to build explosive drones, explicit calls to kill Israelis, and rhetoric defending attacks on synagogues—yet platform enforcement appears uneven and, in many cases, absent or delayed.

According to the American Jewish Committee’s State of Antisemitism in America 2025 Report, 91% of American Jews say they feel less safe as a Jewish person in the U.S. due to attacks on Jews in the past 12 months, and more than half (55%) say they changed their behavior out of fear of antisemitism, including 41% who avoided publicly wearing or displaying items that might identify them as Jewish

The report also found that 73% of American Jews experienced antisemitism online in 2025, with significant increases across all major platforms: Facebook (54%, up from 47% in 2024), Instagram (40%, up from 32%), YouTube (38%, up from 27%), and TikTok (23%, up from 18%).

Justifying Terrorism: When Synagogue Attacks Become “Self-Defense”

In March 2026, as news broke of a terrorist attack on Temple Israel in West Bloomfield, Michigan—where Ayman Muhammad Ghazali rammed his explosives-packed car into a synagogue housing a preschool—the response from some corners of the activist left was not condemnation, but justification.

Abubaker Abed, a contributor to Drop Site News, argued that Ghazali was acting “reasonably to defend himself” against what Abed characterized as the synagogue’s “criminality.” His reasoning: Temple Israel supports the Association of Reform Zionists of America, which backs the Reform movement in Israel. “The fact that they do this in a temple doesn’t rule out its gravity and criminality,” Abed wrote.

Far-left financier Fergie Chambers echoed similar sentiments in response to the attack, stating: “What’s the problem? Seems a measured and appropriate response.” The casualness with which public figures with mainstream connections justified an attack on a synagogue and Jewish school marked a threshold in acceptable discourse.

In March 2026, social media influencer Hasan Piker told his millions of followers that suicide bombing was “dead” but offered an alternative: “Just make f**king drones. You can purchase them from online marketplaces. China literally sells explosive ordnance delivery mechanisms that you can put on a DJI drone. You can buy them at virtually no significant cost.” The commentary, documented by Canary Mission, provided tactical instructions to an audience of 2.5 million Twitch followers.

Piker, who regularly appears on mainstream podcasts, represents a new category of influencer: politically engaged content creators who package extremist rhetoric as progressive activism. His drone bomb tutorial followed months of content glorifying terrorist organizations, downplaying Hamas violence, and describing Zionists in increasingly dehumanizing terms.

Influencer Dan Bilzerian took the rhetoric further, declaring in a clip from a podcast that later went viral on X—with one post of the clip receiving over 1.6 million views “The only battle today that I see worth fighting is exterminating Israel. I would sign up tomorrow to kill Israelis. Give me a rifle and send me the f**k over there. The majority of that country is evil, suppressing Palestinians, operating like terrorists, they’re arrogant bastards. They need to be wiped off the map.”

The statement—explicit genocide advocacy from a figure with over 29 million Instagram followers—generated significant engagement but faced no platform consequences.

The “Kill All Zionists” Phenomenon

Perhaps no phrase better captures the normalization than “Kill All Zionists,” which has appeared spray-painted inside UC Berkeley graduate housing, scrawled on campus buildings, and shared across social media platforms. When Hen Mazzig documented the UC Berkeley graffiti, he asked: “Are Jewish students expected to feel safe when someone is literally calling for their murder? Threats against Jews are escalating while the university looks away.”

Democratic Socialists of America members Donald Parkinson and Utah high school English teacher Christopher Derick Varn took the rhetoric into even darker territory, evoking a modern blood libel when discussing an Iranian school attack. “When someone says there’s a secret cabal of pedophiles, satan-worshiping child-eaters, they are not totally wrong,” the DSA members stated. “They (Israelis) may not literally eat children, but it’s not like they won’t kill children to achieve their goals.”

Students for Justice in Palestine posted in October 2025: “Death to the occupation. Death to Zionism. Death to all collaborators”—language that directly echoed Hamas propaganda justifying the execution of Palestinians accused of working with Israel. The statement generated thousands of shares and inspired similar posts from affiliated chapters nationwide.

The Anti-Defamation League documented in its 2024 audit that for the first time in 46 years of tracking, a majority (58%) of antisemitic incidents contained elements related to Israel or Zionism. This represents a fundamental shift: opposition to Israel has become the primary vehicle for expressing and normalizing violence against Jews.

The Accountability Gap

This moment is defined by an accountability gap: high-reach content that promotes, excuses, or operationalizes antisemitic violence has often remained online with limited or no enforcement, even where platform rules appear to apply. The resulting inconsistency signals that violent rhetoric framed around “Zionists” or Israelis is treated differently than comparable hate speech and incitement.

These concerns extend to emerging amplification pathways. In the American Jewish Committee’s State of Antisemitism in America 2025 Report, 65% of American Jews say they are concerned that generative AI chatbots will spread antisemitism, and 69% say they are concerned that AI-generated information and misinformation will lead to antisemitic incidents.

With violent rhetoric already linked to real-world harm—including firebombings, arsons, and assaults—the key variable is whether platforms and institutions apply existing policies consistently and early enough to reduce the risk of further antisemitic violence.

A comprehensive fact sheet released by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on March 16, 2026, exposes the depth of China's support for the Iranian regime's destabilizing activities across the Middle East, documenting how Beijing serves as Tehran's primary economic lifeline while enabling its military capabilities through technology transfers and sanctions evasion networks

Subscribe now

China as Iran’s Economic Lifeline

China has established itself as Iran’s largest trading partner and the dominant buyer of Iranian oil, with Chinese purchases accounting for approximately 90% of Iran’s exported oil. This relationship provides Iran with tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue that directly supports the Iranian government budget and military operations, according to the Commission report.

The economic partnership was formalized through a “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” signed in 2021, covering economic, security, and technological cooperation over a 25-year period. The Commission identifies this relationship as part of an informal “Axis of Autocracy” that includes China, Iran, Russia, and North Korea, nations united by a shared desire to challenge U.S. global leadership and reshape the international system to favor authoritarian governance.

Systematic Sanctions Evasion

The report details how China enables Iran to circumvent international sanctions through sophisticated trade and financial networks, technology transfers, and dual-use trade arrangements. Chinese banks, front companies, and intermediary firms facilitate oil transactions and operate the shadow fleet that transports Iranian oil while providing access to controlled technologies supporting Iran’s missile and drone programs. This infrastructure includes money laundering operations that allow the entire network to function with relative impunity.

Military Technology Transfers

While China largely ceased direct weapons transfers in 2015 following UN Security Council Resolution 2231, security cooperation has shifted toward dual-use technology sales and transfers of defense-related technologies. Chinese components, including sensors, voltage converters, and semiconductors, have been discovered in Iranian drones used both by Tehran’s regional proxies and those exported to Russia for deployment in Ukraine.

Recent Escalation in Military Support

The report highlights several concerning recent developments. In the days leading up to U.S. and Israeli strikes in February 2026, anonymously sourced reports indicated China was engaged in direct arms sales to Iran, including offensive drones and a nearly finalized deal to sell anti-ship cruise missiles.

Most significantly, during the week of March 2, two state-owned Iranian vessels departed China’s Gaolan Port carrying what is believed to be sodium perchlorate, a key precursor used in solid rocket fuel for missiles. This followed a similar incident in January 2025 when two Iranian ships docked in China and were loaded with approximately 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate. Additionally, China granted Iran full military access to its BeiDou satellite navigation system in 2021.

Calibrated Diplomatic Response

Despite the expanding partnership, the relationship remains asymmetric. Iran depends heavily on China for energy export revenue and diplomatic backing, while Beijing maintains a cautious approach to avoid jeopardizing relations with other Middle Eastern partners such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Following recent U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, Beijing has limited its official support to diplomatic statements characterizing the actions as violations of international law, condemning the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and calling for immediate cessation of attacks. In a call with his Iranian counterpart, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi both reiterated China’s support for Iran’s sovereignty and expressed confidence that Iran will “pay attention to the legitimate concerns of its neighbors.”

Multilateral Integration Strategy

China has helped ease Iran’s international isolation by facilitating its entrance into alternative multilateral institutions, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023 and BRICS in 2024. Membership in these organizations brings Iran into closer alignment with China and Russia while helping Beijing’s goal of using them to promote illiberal norms and mitigate the impact of sanctions tools.

The Commission notes that China’s direct military engagements with Iran occur primarily through trilateral or multilateral activities rather than bilateral meetings. The PLA has participated in regular joint naval exercises with Iran and Russia since 2019, though China apparently did not join the 2026 iteration.

Strategic Implications

The Commission states this partnership emboldens each actor to take more provocative actions, believing that mutual support will help them withstand the consequences. China views the Islamic Republic of Iran as a partner in balancing U.S. influence in the Middle East while serving as a key supplier of discounted energy resources, a relationship that runs directly counter to U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) released a report on Sunday noting the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign is making measurable progress in neutralizing Iran’s critical missile and drone capabilities, systematically degrading Tehran’s ability to execute its asymmetric warfare strategy against Western interests in the Gulf region. A senior Israeli military official reported that between 260 and 290 of Iran’s estimated 410 to 440 missile launchers—approximately 63% to 70%—have been destroyed or rendered combat ineffective since operations began.

The campaign has focused on eliminating Iran’s drone and ballistic missile capabilities, which Tehran relies on to inflict casualties, disrupt regional oil infrastructure, and impose political pressure on the United States and its Gulf allies. Israeli intelligence reports indicate that Iranian missile force troops are demoralized, with personnel deserting and refusing orders as the combined force continues striking launch sites and command infrastructure.

Subscribe now

Iran’s Five-Pronged Strategy Under Pressure

Iran developed a multi-pronged asymmetric strategy designed to outlast rather than militarily defeat the United States and Israel in an existential conflict. The strategy consists of five lines of effort: drone and ballistic missile attacks to inflict casualties and economic damage in the Gulf, drone, missile, and naval attacks including mines to disrupt Persian Gulf shipping, proxy attacks from Hezbollah and Iranian-backed groups, global terrorism, and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure.

The U.S.-Israeli combined force prioritized neutralizing drone and missile capabilities because these assets pose the most immediate threat to regional stability and oil markets. According to the ISW, these weapons systems can cause the most lasting damage to energy infrastructure and impose the most severe political pressure on Western governments through sustained attacks.

Iranian ballistic missile and drone launches have decreased gradually since the beginning of operations, though the regime continues firing reduced volumes of munitions. Some individual drones have penetrated air defenses and damaged oil infrastructure in recent weeks, including a March 11 attack on Omani oil facilities and a March 13 missile strike that damaged five tankers in Saudi Arabia.

No Evidence of Strategic Reserve

Speculation that Iran is hoarding advanced missile systems for later use after allied interceptor stockpiles are depleted finds little support in available evidence. Iran is currently deploying advanced missile systems including the Sejjil and Khorramshar against Israeli targets, contradicting claims of strategic withholding.

The ISW assessment notes that hoarding missiles would represent a gamble Iran cannot afford. Such a strategy assumes Tehran will retain sufficient launchers to continue firing advanced missiles once the United States expends its interceptors, an assumption undermined by the systematic destruction of Iranian launch infrastructure. The strategy also presumes Iran can accurately assess U.S. and Israeli interceptor stockpiles, which Tehran has no reliable method of doing.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) almost certainly lacks the command-and-control capability necessary to execute centrally-directed operations that prioritize certain munitions over others, according to the analysis. Iranian officials stated in November 2025 that they would launch thousands of missiles targeting Israel in any future war, indicating IRGC commanders likely emphasized mass attacks before operations began. Tehran has since noted it decentralized operations and adopted a “fire at will” approach in response to U.S. and Israeli strikes on military leadership.

Any strategic shift during the war to withhold missiles for later strikes would require central direction to ensure different organizational elements respond as headquarters desires. The combined force attacks on Iranian command and control and military leadership have likely disrupted Iran’s ability to manage such sophisticated planning.

Maritime Campaign Follows Phased Approach

U.S. Central Command planned to suppress Iran’s maritime attacks through multiple phases mirroring the overall campaign structure, suppression of enemy air defenses along the coast to enable additional strikes and helicopter patrols, suppression of Iranian ballistic missile and drone attacks, destruction of Iran’s navy, and ultimately, defeat of Iran’s anti-ship missile and drone capabilities.

The last Iranian attack on merchant shipping occurred on March 11, though it remains unclear whether this represents successful suppression of Iranian capabilities or decreased shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran may decide to mine the strait if its ability to target shipping becomes sufficiently degraded, but minesweeping operations would eventually clear the passage and restore traffic flow. Tehran must also calculate how mining the strait would affect its own oil export capabilities, as mines do not distinguish between ships Iran wants to pass through and those it wishes to attack.

Military Progress Amid Strategic Uncertainty

The ISW assessment concludes that available evidence supports the conclusion that the combined campaign is achieving its military objectives thus far, but operations remain incomplete. The collapse in Iranian drone and missile attack rates since late February presents compelling evidence that the military campaign is degrading Tehran’s ballistic missile and drone capabilities.

Continued drone and missile attacks, along with the remaining 150 launchers, indicate these assets remain a threat requiring full suppression. The maritime threat similarly requires sustained operations to neutralize. The analysis notes that while it remains too early to forecast whether the campaign will achieve overall political objectives or how long oil flow disruptions will last, declaring the operation a military failure is premature while the campaign remains underway and evidence clearly shows progress toward core objectives.

A previously unknown group — Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right (IMCR) — has emerged online, claiming responsibility for several antisemitic attacks on Jewish institutions in Europe in March. Belgian prosecutors are analyzing a circulating Liège-related video, while Dutch authorities are investigating possible links between the incidents.

The name also appears in Arabic as “Harakat Ashab al‑Yamin al‑Islamiyyah,” and its responsibility claims have circulated rapidly via Telegram channels associated with the “Axis of Resistance,” according to Long War Journal. Other reporting has consistently stressed that none of these claims have been independently verified and that authorities are still assessing the material as investigations continue

What is IMCR—and what is still unknown

Open-source reporting to date describes IMCR as a “previously unknown” label that began posting (or being credited with) claim materials only after the March attacks, leaving basic questions unresolved: whether it is a real organization with command-and-control, a temporary cover identity used by other actors, or a fabrication attached to unrelated crimes.

FDD’s Long War Journal said it could not verify the original source of the group’s statement and a key Liège video, and it separately reported a second “Greece” claim that lacked corroborating open-source evidence on the date asserted—an early indicator that the online brand may be outrunning verified facts.

Timeline of Attacks

Below is a consolidated timeline based on publicly reported incidents and the status of online claims:

• March 9 — Liège, Belgium: Explosion outside the synagogue damages property; no injuries reported; Belgium’s federal prosecutor leads the case.

• March 11 — Greece: an IMCR-branded claim circulated online alleging an attack on a ‘Zionist,’ but no location was specified and Long War Journal reported no corroborating open-source evidence of a matching incident.

• March 13 — Rotterdam, Netherlands: an overnight explosion and fire damaged a synagogue entrance; four teenagers were arrested after police stopped a suspicious car near another synagogue.

• March 14 — Amsterdam, Netherlands: Explosion damages a Jewish school; mayor calls it a deliberate attack; separate outlets report an IMCR-linked claim video.

• March 16 — Amsterdam, Netherlands: Explosion damages an office building; police investigate after the same group that claimed the Jewish school attack also claimed responsibility, but authorities have not confirmed the claim or any Jewish-community link to the building.

  

Explosion in Liège

Belgian police reported a blast at around 04:00 local time in front of the synagogue in Liège that damaged windows across the street while causing no injuries, and the city’s mayor described the incident as “an antisemitic act.”

Belgium’s federal prosecutor’s office is leading the investigation, and Belgian broadcaster VRT reported that prosecutors were analyzing circulating footage to determine whether it is genuine and where it originated, while also urging the public not to distribute the video.

Rotterdam Arrests

In Rotterdam, Dutch police arrested four teenagers after an overnight fire and explosion damaged the entrance of a synagogue at about 3:40 a.m., with police reporting no injuries and stating the blaze went out on its own.

A JTA report carried by The Forward said a group calling itself IMCR claimed responsibility via a video posted to social media, but investigators had not confirmed its authenticity or any direct Belgium-Netherlands link.

IMCR Claims Responsibility for Amsterdam Attack

In Amsterdam, an explosion caused minor damage to a Jewish school, and the city’s mayor described it as “a deliberate attack against the Jewish community,” with no injuries reported. The attack was also subsequently claimed by IMCR.

The Times of Israel reported that social-media accounts linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard circulated a purported IMCR-attributed clip of the Amsterdam attack.

A Signal-to-Noise Problem

IMCR-branded media content has included a claimed attempted attack in Greece, but FDD’s Long War Journal said it found no open-source evidence of suspected terrorism or attack matching the video’s claim and could not verify the source of the footage.

That gap matters because the same online channel dynamics—rapid reposting, re-editing, and cross-platform mirroring—can create an impression of coordinated operations even when the underlying material is unverified or repackaged, especially as security forces work to correctly identify the group and its members across Europe.

Iran Connection Under Investigation

Long War Journal reported that Telegram channels aligned with the “Axis of Resistance,” which include Hezbollah, the IRGC, and other radical Shia channels, widely disseminated the IMCR-branded materials and highlighted the brand resemblance to Iranian-aligned militant aesthetics, while stressing that it remains unclear whether IMCR is authentic, a front group, or a hoax. The timing has coincided with public warnings from Iranian officials that European states joining the U.S. and Israel could face retaliation.

The broader security backdrop has also been shaped by public Iranian warnings: EUobserver reported that Iran’s deputy foreign minister Majid Takht‑Ravanchi said European states joining the US and Israel in attacks on Iran would be “legitimate targets for Iranian retaliation,” a statement that European outlets have cited as part of heightened concern about spillover.

What to Watch Next

The next decisive facts are likely to come from prosecutorial findings: whether the videos are authentic and traceable, whether suspects in the Netherlands have provable links to claim-material producers, and whether cross-border coordination can be established beyond thematic similarities.

In the interim, IMCR is best understood as an unverified claim label attached to real incidents in Belgium and the Netherlands and amplified through Iran-aligned online channels, rather than a confirmed organization shown to have directed them.

Demonstrators across major U.S. cities openly celebrated designated terrorist organizations and employed widespread antisemitic rhetoric during Al-Quds Day protests on March 13, 2026. In New York and Chicago, participants chanted “We Support Hezbollah Here, we support Hamas here,” shouted “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”, and invoked historically antisemitic threat language.

According to the Anti-Defamation League, protesters openly expressed support for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the October 7, 2023 Hamas massacre.

NYC Rally Details

The New York protest began in Times Square on March 13 and proceeded through midtown Manhattan, drawing hundreds. Organizers affiliated with the Bronx Anti-War Coalition, Pal-Awda, and the Workers World Party explicitly praised terrorist leaders by name.

Share

One speaker stated: “We honor the military prowess of our beloved commanders, martyr Yahya Sinwar, the lion of Gaza, Hassan Nasrallah, and all of the valiant commanders of the IRGC.” Protesters carried flags of Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both U.S.-designated terror organizations. Speakers also directed crowds to chant antisemitic blood libel accusations, including “Stop eating babies, stop raping children.”

The “Khaybar” Chant

At the Times Square al-Quds Day rally on March 13, 2026, protesters repeatedly chanted “Haydar! Haydar! Khaybar! Khaybar!” The chant invokes two loaded historical references. “Haydar” is an epithet for Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, revered in Shia Islam as a symbol of militant struggle. “Khaybar” references the seventh-century Battle of Khaybar, a Muslim military conquest against Jewish tribes in what is now Saudi Arabia.

Together, the chant functions as a direct threat, invoking historical conquest of Jews and implying future violence against contemporary Jewish populations. Authorities in multiple Western jurisdictions have classified variations of this chant as hate speech, and it has been cited in investigations of antisemitic hate crimes at Palestinian advocacy protests.

Antisemitic Conspiracy Rhetoric

According to the ADL, some protesters drew explicit parallels between disgraced financier Jeffrey Epstein and Israel, leveraging the criminal scandal to delegitimize Jewish and Israeli identity. In New York, demonstrators displayed a modified Israeli flag featuring Epstein's likeness in place of the Star of David. In Houston, protest signage read "Epstein axis vs. resistance axis," a rhetorical device linking Jewish identity with criminal conduct and moral corruption.

Iranian Regime Tool for Regional Influence

The annual event, held on the last Friday of Ramadan, explicitly aims to coordinate global opposition to Israel while advancing Iranian regime interest. The 2026 demonstrations—occurring amid Operation Epic Fury and heightened U.S.-Iran tensions—represent one of the most expansive displays of open terror group support at U.S. Al-Quds Day events in recent years, signaling the Iranian regime's deepening influence over American protest movements and its ongoing efforts to radicalize diaspora communities.

After U.S. Central Command launched Operation Epic Fury on Feb. 28, Israel began Operation Roaring Lion the same day. Since then, multiple antisemitic attacks and security incidents targeting Jewish institutions or Jews have been reported across North America and Europe. These incidents have included synagogue shootings in Canada and a vehicle-ramming attack at a Michigan synagogue.

They have also involved explosions and arson at Jewish sites in Belgium and the Netherlands. Meanwhile, Israeli and European reporting has raised questions about whether the surge could reflect intensified Iranian regime-linked activity overseas, alongside a rise in public claims of responsibility.

The Israeli National Security Council has warned that the conflict increases the likelihood of attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets abroad, and has urged heightened vigilance

Share

Synagogue Shootings in Toronto

Toronto police said gunfire damaged Temple Emanu-El late on March 2; separate reporting said the shooting came hours after a Purim celebration had ended. The Anti-Defamation League documented two additional Toronto-area synagogue shootings on March 7—North York’s Shaarei Shomayim and Thornhill’s Beth Avraham Yoseph (BAYT)—occurring within 20–30 minutes of each other, also with no injuries reported.

ADL cited Statistics Canada data showing 920 police-reported anti-Jewish hate crimes in 2024. Separately, B’nai Brith Canada’s annual audit recorded 6,219 antisemitic incidents.

Attacks on Jewish Sites in Michigan

Reuters reported that during the March 12 attack in West Bloomfield, Michigan, the suspect rammed a pickup truck into Temple Israel’s synagogue/preschool area.

PBS NewsHour reported that investigators treated the incident as a targeted act of violence against the Jewish community and connected it to a broader U.S. conversation about rising antisemitic violence. Reuters also cited ADL’s U.S. 2024 total of 9,354 antisemitic incidents, describing it as a record high.

Separately, in a statement posted on X, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said its intelligence assessed that the Michigan attacker, identified by the IDF as Ayman Muhammad Ghazali, was the brother of Hezbollah commander Ibrahim Muhammad Ghazali. The IDF alleged Ibrahim Muhammad Ghazali managed weapons operations within a specialized branch of Hezbollah’s Badr Unit, which it said has been involved in launching rockets toward Israeli civilians

Belgium & the Netherlands: Explosion, Arson and School Attack

Belgian authorities and officials characterized a March 9 pre-dawn explosion at a synagogue in Liège as an antisemitic attack that caused damage but no injuries, while federal-level structures took over parts of the probe. Deutsche Welle reported counterterrorism police involvement and quoted the Liège mayor condemning an “extremely violent act of antisemitism,” tying the atmosphere to the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran.

In Rotterdam, Dutch police announced arrests of four suspects after an arson attack involving an explosion at about 3:40 a.m. on March 13, with surveillance increased at other synagogues and no injuries reported. DW recounted that the fire burned briefly and went out, and it linked the case to a broader run of suspected antisemitic incidents since the Iran war began.

On March 14, Reuters reported an explosion causing minor damage at a Jewish school in Amsterdam, with Mayor Femke Halsema describing it as a deliberate attack against the Jewish community and announcing increased security measures. DW added that police believed two suspects arrived by scooter, placed an object against a wall, and fled as it detonated.

Antisemitic Attacks in Norway and France

Norwegian police detained a man in his 20s after a reported security situation near the Trondheim synagogue on March 12, with local reporting describing a vehicle fleeing and a chase, while police said the situation was under control. The Times of Israel reported that police investigated suspicious behavior, cordoned off areas, and searched for a vehicle that left the scene.

In France, the European Jewish Congress reported that a 14-year-old Jewish girl was assaulted in Sarcelles and threatened with death with antisemitic remarks, with two 12-year-old suspects arrested and the victim taken to hospital in shock. The Algemeiner reported police accounts describing antisemitic slurs and an ongoing search for a third suspect.

“Ashab Al Yamin”: Attack Claims and Telegram Amplification

The Jerusalem Post reported that a previously unknown group calling itself “Ashab Al Yamin” claimed responsibility for attacks in Liège, Greece (details not fully specified in the article), and Rotterdam, and that its videos circulated on “Shi’ite axis” Telegram channels associated with Hezbollah or IRGC-linked ecosystems. However, the claims made by Ashab Al Yamin have not yet been independently verified.

Jewish News (UK) similarly reported that the group claimed Rotterdam and also claimed Liège and Greece, while quoting European Jewish Congress concerns about a coordinated network.

Separately, Ynet reported that senior Israeli officials viewed Iran as pushing overseas attacks as a core war component and cited CAM-linked figures about incident volumes in the same period. CAM itself reported a 34% weekly rise in monitored antisemitic incidents after the war began, and CAM’s March 12 weekly report summarized a separate week’s tally and included synagogue-related incidents in multiple countries.

A widely shared X post by Rachel Riley compiled a cross-country list of these incidents, illustrating how attack reporting, claims, and security warnings propagate through social media aggregation.

International Condemnation Security Posture

UN News summarized the Canada shootings, the Liège explosion, the Michigan attack, and the Rotterdam arson probe, and it quoted the UN Secretary-General’s spokesperson condemning the attacks and calling for protection of religious sites. Israel’s NSC has continued to urge heightened vigilance abroad, including minimizing exposure at Jewish/Israeli sites and reducing identifiable markers in public.

A March 11 report published by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), authored by Meriem Mokhtari, warns that even as U.S.-Israeli strikes degrade Iranian command-and-control and financial infrastructure, the campaign to sever proxy financing remains “unfinished.” The report claims Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon are now pivoting to the Muslim Brotherhood’s global financial apparatus as an alternative funding backbone, with the “last-mile” node increasingly anchored in Doha and Ankara/Istanbul.

The central allegation is that “humanitarian” fundraising, shadow banking, exchange-house transfers, and crypto rails can be stitched into a single operational pipeline—one that survives leadership relocations and outpaces enforcement.

Share

Iran’s State Channels Were Hit—So The Network Migrated

The report states that within the first 72 hours of conflict, the Central Bank of Iran’s digital infrastructure was incapacitated, and Iranian internet connectivity fell 99% from prewar levels.

It describes Iran’s prewar proxy-funding model as dependent on state-linked sources like the CBI and National Development Fund, supplemented by IRGC “dark fleet” oil tactics that masked crude as “Malaysian blend” sold predominantly to China. The disruption inside Iran, JINSA argues, triggered an immediate cash‑flow crunch—pushing the financing burden outward to a more dispersed set of non‑state facilitators abroad, including networks with Muslim Brotherhood‑linked reach.

The report anchors its argument in a wartime disruption scenario—asserting that Iran’s conventional command-and-control and financial transfer capacity was degraded, accelerating a pivot to non-state intermediaries.

Funding Routes

According to the JINSA report, the cash pipeline doesn’t flow through one clean channel—it splits into four parallel routes that ultimately converge on a tight network of Gaza-based money changers who convert inbound transfers into physical cash for Hamas commanders.

Route 1 — Iran-to-Gaza (Degraded)

JINSA describes a prewar route in which Iranian funds moved through Lebanon, then passed through Turkish money changers, and finally entered Gaza. Israeli and U.S. intelligence reportedly confirmed that the network transferred hundreds of millions of dollars to Hamas leadership before the current conflict crippled parts of the pipeline.

The Insight also claims that since January 2025, Iran sent more than $1 billion to Hezbollah through the same exchange-house mechanism—evidence, in JINSA’s framing, of the route’s scale even as the Iranian terminal has been degraded.

Route 2 — Direct Qatari Government Cash (Suspended for Now)

Beginning in 2018, JINSA states Qatar channeled $30 million per month into Gaza as physical cash—an arrangement that the Insight argues functioned less like relief and more like operational oxygen. A joint U.S.-Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly found that much of that money supported Hamas’s military infrastructure, and the Insight adds that internal Hamas documents seized by Israel indicate direct Qatari government funding of Hamas military activity.

This route has been suspended since October 2023, JINSA notes, because physical cash delivery into Gaza became impossible—and the Insight assesses that current operations foreclose any near-term resumption. Source

Route 3 — The Istanbul Network (Active Now — Main Route)

JINSA identifies the Istanbul network as the primary active channel: Qatar-based charities raise donations under humanitarian cover, then transfer funds to Istanbul, where Hamas’s finance apparatus allegedly stores value in a reported $500 million portfolio of Turkish real estate and shares. The Insight names Zaher Jabarin—described as Hamas’s director of finance and previously sanctioned by Treasury—as the figure tied to this asset base, which JINSA argues remains operational regardless of where Hamas’s political leadership relocates.

From there, funds move through currency exchange businesses into Gaza, and JINSA cites Treasury records indicating one exchange house alone sent more than $21 million to Hamas and its military wing between 2017 and 2019. In the final link, roughly ten Gaza money changers—known to Israeli intelligence, the report says—turn those transfers into cash for field units.

Route 4 — European Donations (Active Now)

JINSA argues that Hamas-linked fundraising in Western Europe generates millions in “humanitarian” donations that are then laundered through Turkish exchange houses and delivered to operational commanders. JINSA reports that MB-linked umbrella groups in Europe function as backbone infrastructure for this pipeline and contends that regulatory enforcement has lagged—creating exploitable arbitrage. Most notably for U.S. enforcement, the Insight states that some transfers pass through American banking systems, which JINSA frames as both an exposure point and an opportunity for disruption under U.S. law.

The Convergence Layer: Shadow Banking + Crypto

The Insight details a “hybrid-finance” architecture that merges (1) Hamas as an interoperability bridge to both the IRGC and Brotherhood-linked networks, (2) a FinCEN-examined $9 billion shadow-banking system that uses UAE/Turkey front companies and U.S. correspondent accounts, and (3) a digital backbone where TRM Labs allegedly confirmed shared TRON-based wallet clusters and high-risk exchanges. The report also highlights a “A7 wallet cluster” it describes as a $39 billion node connecting Russia and Iran.

The Policy Playbook

JINSA’s bottom line is that Treasury already has an off‑the‑shelf toolkit for turning financial pressure into operational disruption: it urges using Section 311 to flag the Brotherhood’s International Organization as a “Primary Money Laundering Concern,” while Treasury’s own guidance describes Section 311 as a flexible way to shield the U.S. financial system from targeted money‑laundering and terror‑finance threats.

From there, the report’s logic is straightforward: FinCEN’s special measures are the plumbing that operationalizes restrictions inside the banking system, and OFAC’s virtual-currency guidance makes clear the same compliance expectations apply when value moves via wallets and stablecoins—not just wires and cash.

Independent journalist Nate Friedman filmed two vans being loaded with stacks of professionally pre-printed signs at the People’s Forum building on 37th Street in Manhattan two hours before the February 28, 2026, anti-Iran war protest began.

Video footage captures Friedman staking out the location—a known hub for left-wing activism—before following the vehicles directly to Columbus Circle, the site of the demonstration. According to Friedman’s on-the-ground reporting, sign distributed at the protest originated from those specific vans, suggesting organized logistical preparation for the protest.

The signs loaded into the vehicles included specific branding for the Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL), alongside Palestinian and Cuban flags, despite the event being billed as an emergency response to U.S. strikes on Iran. In the video, Friedman approached the individuals loading the materials, asking, “You guys doing this for free?” The individuals did not respond to the inquiry and continued loading megaphones, literature, and placards into the transport vehicles.

The footage appears to show protest materials being prepared at The People’s Forum before the February 28 anti-Iran-war demonstration. Separately, reporting and congressional investigators have linked The People’s Forum and allied groups to a broader protest network financed in part through entities associated with Neville Roy Singham, a Shanghai-based former tech executive described by investigators as having longstanding ties to CCP-linked networks. The People’s Forum, where the signs originated, serves as a central operational hub for multiple activist groups funded by Singham’s network.

The Documentation Trail

IRS 990 tax forms filed by the People’s Forum reveal that key organizers receive substantial annual salaries for their activism work. Documents show David (Sung Mo) Chung, a lead organizer for New York City pro-Palestine rallies, received approximately $75,000 to protest. Friedman confronted Chung on camera regarding his salary and role; Chung responded repeatedly with “No comment.” The Jerusalem Post independently confirmed Chung’s financial ties to the organization.

Another key figure identified in the footage is Layan Fuleihan, a full-time educator and organizer at the People’s Forum. Tax filings for the People’s Forum from 2024 indicate she received compensation of $70,000 plus $8,649 in additional compensation, totaling approximately $78,649 annually. Records show Fuleihan traveled to Venezuela to attend a conference featuring Nicolás Maduro. Social media archives show she tweeted “Long live the Palestinian resistance” on October 7, 2023. Fuleihan has previously been arrested at protests and bailed out by the People’s Forum.

Share

The Timeline Anomaly

Fox News reported an unusual mobilization timeline on February 28, raising questions about the speed and preparedness of the protest response:

• 2:34 AM: The ANSWER Coalition sent an emergency nationwide protest announcement.

• 2:44 AM: President Trump officially announced the strikes on Iran—10 minutes after the protest alert was issued.

• 2:52 AM: The People’s Forum issued a call for an emergency protest in Times Square.

• 9:09 AM: China’s Foreign Ministry released a statement using language identical to that used by the U.S. protest network.

The Funding Network

Financial records trace the funding of these operations to Neville Roy Singham, the founder of ThoughtWorks who currently resides in Shanghai. The New York Post reported that Singham has been spurring protests nationwide through a complex web of non-profits. Public reporting shows Singham donated over $20 million to the People's Forum through a donor-advised fund managed by Goldman Sachs, obscuring the original source of the capital.

Singham’s wife, Jodie Evans, co-founded the anti-war group Code Pink. Financial disclosures reveal Code Pink received more than $1.4 million from Singham-linked entities, constituting over 25% of its total budget. In February 2026, the State Department transmitted a formal report to Congress identifying Code Pink and the People's Forum as conduits for Chinese influence operations, according to reporting by the New York Post and Fox News. According to reporting by Friedman and an independent investigation by Shomrim, the ANSWER Coalition is funded via the Progress Unity Fund, which has reportedly received funding from the Tides Foundation.

The Pattern Recognition

Fox News investigative reporter Asra Nomani infiltrated the network’s Signal rapid-response chats and obtained National Park Service permits that contained scripted “run of show” documents for protests. Her investigation appeared on the network, detailing how the same organizations cycle their personnel and resources through various causes, from anti-ICE demonstrations in Minneapolis and Los Angeles to pro-Palestine marches and pro-Maduro rallies.

According to Nomani’s analysis, the combined revenues of the network, including affiliated labor unions, exceed $2 billion. A report by Shomrim detailed the hidden hands behind these anti-war protests, noting the high level of professionalization. Separately, Crowds on Demand, a corporate crowd-rental service, reported a 400% increase in inquiries for paid demonstrators.

The Government Response

Federal authorities have begun scrutinizing the network’s activities. Senator Chuck Grassley wrote to FBI Director Kash Patel and Attorney General Pam Bondi, urging them to assess whether The People’s Forum and Code Pink should register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

In September 2025, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Jason Smith sent a letter demanding records from the People's Forum, as part of an ongoing committee investigation to ensure the U.S. tax-exempt sector is not abusing the lucrative federal benefits they currently enjoy or undermining U.S. national interests. The State Department subsequently transmitted a formal report to Congress in February 2026 outlining the network’s ties to foreign influence operations.

In the first week of Operation Epic Fury, X was awash in negative commentary portraying the U.S.-Israeli campaign against Iran as illegitimate, politically toxic, or contrary to American interests. But much of that framing, a new review suggests, was not being driven by Americans at all. Jewish Onliner partnered with an independent firm specializing in large-scale social media data processing to examine 100 highly viral posts of +10,000 shares each. What the data revealed was a platform environment in which foreign-based accounts played an outsized role in shaping the volume, virality, and tone of what millions of users saw.

Share

The firm’s seven-day social listening review, covering February 28 through March 7, tracked posts containing the keyword “Iran” and found an information environment of extraordinary scale: 98 million posts, 696.4 million interactions, and a staggering 1.5 trillion potential views. Within that volume, a clear pattern emerged at the top of the engagement hierarchy. Seven of the ten accounts generating the most interaction on the topic were based outside the United States, and every one of those foreign-based accounts was negative toward the operation.

At the Top of the Feed, Foreign Accounts Ruled

A separate cut of the data — looking specifically at the ten most viral individual posts — told the same story. Seven of those ten posts were authored by foreign accounts, and all seven expressed opposition to Epic Fury. The ten posts in descending order are:

@NYCMayor — USA; @maddenifico — USA; @jasonhickel — Spain; @hashjenni — South Asia; @KimDotcom — New Zealand; @jimNjue_ — Kenya; @MuhammadSmiry — Gaza; @CatWomaniya — India; @georgegalloway — Europe; @ImperiumFirst — USA.

Deeper in the Data, the Pattern Held — and the Reach Gap Was Stark

To get a closer look at the post level, the firm reviewed 100 highly viral “Iran” posts from the same period — which are available to view here — each of which had received more than 10,000 shares. The reach disparity in that sample was immediate and significant: the 60 foreign-origin posts generated approximately 155.6 million views, compared to 93.4 million for the 40 U.S.-based posts — a gap of more than 62 million views.

Foreign accounts, in other words, were reaching a substantially larger audience. And they were doing so with complete uniformity. Not one of those 60 non-U.S. posts expressed support for the operation. Among U.S.-based posts, opinion was split (75 percent were negative, 25 percent positive). The bottom line is that 90 of the 100 most-shared posts in the dataset were hostile to Epic Fury, and every single one of the ten pro-operation posts came from an American account.

The foreign accounts driving much of that engagement were not fringe voices. Several were large, established presences on X with audiences in the millions — and their approaches differed in instructive ways. Some leaned into broad geopolitical framing: BRICS News and media personality Mario Nawfal, both operating out of the UAE, cast the operation in an anti-Western register.

Others reached deeper into American domestic politics to find their wedge. Jackson Hinkle, posting from Russia, and UK-based commentators including AdameMedia and George Galloway used the language of the American right against the operation itself — framing the strikes as a “betrayal of MAGA” and claiming the campaign was “highly unpopular with the American people.”

Account locations were verified by the firm through a combination of platform data, publicly available profile information, and independent corroboration.

What the Numbers Actually Mean

None of this is to say that criticism of Operation Epic Fury was purely manufactured or that no genuine domestic opposition existed. The point is that foreign-based accounts were disproportionately influential in driving the most visible anti-operation narratives on the platform. That matters because visibility is easily mistaken for consensus. When the most viral posts on a subject relentlessly push a single line, it creates the impression of a broad, organic public mood. As the week-one data makes clear, that impression was not fully accurate.

X remains one of the most influential platforms for political perception and real-time war coverage. But as this first-week snapshot illustrates, what looks like a spontaneous national reckoning can sometimes be a highly amplified signal from abroad — a reminder that the loudest voices online are not always the most representative ones.

On Friday, March 13, the last Friday of Ramadan, demonstrations are expected in cities around the world for what the Iranian regime calls ‘Quds Day,’ or Jerusalem Day, with related rallies planned in some places for several days afterward.

Israeli and American flags are burned. Missiles are paraded through Tehran. Senior Iranian officials step up to podiums and declare that the “Zionist regime” is on the verge of collapse. Crowds chant “Death to Israel” and “Death to America.” Officially framed as a day of “solidarity with Palestinians.” However, in practice it’s a state-sponsored event, funded and exported by the Iranian government, and it has occurred annually since 1979.

This year, Quds Day-related events are set to take place from March 13 to March 15, with major rallies already announced in New York, Houston, London, and Toronto.

Given the event’s long history of extremist rhetoric, glorification of terrorist groups, and recurring security concerns, Quds Day rallies may warrant heightened scrutiny from law enforcement and public officials, particularly when organized in major Western cities.

Subscribe now

A Revolution With a Global Blueprint

When Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated power after the Islamic Revolution, his ambitions didn’t stop at Iran’s borders. Within weeks, he declared the creation of International Quds Day on August 7, 1979, calling on Muslims worldwide to rally against Israel’s control of Jerusalem. It was sold as an act of solidarity with Palestinians. In reality, it was a calculated ideological move.

Jerusalem — al-Quds in Arabic — holds deep spiritual significance across all branches of Islam. By anchoring his revolution to the Palestinian cause, Khomeini effectively bypassed the Sunni-Shia divide that might otherwise have limited his reach. Suddenly, Iran’s revolutionary message wasn’t just for Shia Muslims, it was framed as a pan-Islamic duty. Senior Iranian clerics even described participation in Quds Day as a religious obligation, elevating political mobilization into an act of faith.

The Bigger Danger

Critics argue that the West dangerously misreads Iran by focusing almost entirely on its missiles and proxies. Iran’s most durable weapon they say, is its ideas. By positioning itself as the uncompromising defender of Jerusalem, Tehran has constructed a moral shield that makes it politically costly for even Sunni Arab governments, who privately distrust Iran, to push back against its narrative.

The West dangerously misreads Iran by focusing almost entirely on its missiles and proxies. Iran's most durable weapon they say, is its ideas. By picking the Palestinian cause, an issue that resonates with all Muslims, not just Shia ones, Tehran constructed a moral shield that made it politically hard for Sunni Arab governments to push back. Opposing Iran's narrative meant looking like you were against Palestinians.

The result is a paradox that plays out every year on Quds Day, a Shia-majority state successfully speaks to and mobilizes Sunni populations across the globe, all under the banner of Palestinian liberation. For Israel and the Jewish world, this matters enormously. It means the threat isn’t only rockets from Gaza or Hezbollah tunnels in Lebanon, it’s a decades-long ideological campaign that has normalized eliminationist language about the Jewish state in mainstream Muslim discourse worldwide.

A Global Network of Influence

What makes Quds Day alarming is the infrastructure behind it. Iran doesn’t simply hold rallies at home, it finances and organizes events in over 80 countries annually, including Western cities like New York, London, Berlin, and Toronto. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) uses the occasion to showcase ballistic missiles and military hardware, while its proxies — Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Houthis — coordinate their messaging in lockstep with Tehran.

Critics, including the ADL and other watchdogs, have documented antisemitic tropes, praise for terrorist groups, and violent rhetoric associated with Quds Day messaging and some related rallies. Iran’s state-controlled Kayhan newspaper has published pieces prior to Quds Day praising Adolf Hitler. Israeli cyber authorities have repeatedly warned of heightened cyber risk around Quds Day, and Israeli media have linked some attacks to that period.

Quds Day is not simply an annual protest to be tolerated or ignored. It’s the most visible expression of a 46-year-old campaign to delegitimize, isolate, and ultimately eliminate the State of Israel, pursued not only through weapons, but through words, symbols, and the deliberate shaping of global opinion.

Nearly half a century after Khomeini launched it, that campaign is still running, and still spreading.